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To THE READER
The Western State University Consumer Law Journal's purpose is
to provide a comprehensive resource, focused on commerce, for attor-
neys and the general public. It was conceived to serve as an aid in the
analysis, evaluation and advocacy of issues that confront everyone as
they act as, or on behalf of, consumers of products, services and their
interrelated concerns; the marketing, merchandising, advertising, fi-
nancial, charitable and legal components of commerce.
The Consumer Law Journal has, therefore a broad reach, but a
singular goal; to serve as a conduit of information from those who
have knowledge of a particular part of the universe of commerce to
those who have need of it.
In this, the second volume of the Western State University Con-
sumer Law Journal, the conscience of our economy is examined in
Charity Begins at Home: Alternatives in Nonprofit Regulation and in
Diagnosing and Treating the Slumlord Syndrome. The unanticipated
side effects of the revolution in productivity through chemicals and its
attendant risks to society has resulted in the need to monitor our ex-
posure to them. The question of who should bear the burden of track-
ing these risks is discussed in Medical Monitoring: A New Cause of
Action in California. One of the largest groups of consumers provided
specific protections in their transactions are the buyers of
automobiles. An updated understanding of these rules is provided in
The California Lemon Law: A Misunderstood Statute.
We are pleased to be able to continue to distribute the Journal to
law offices in Orange County on a complimentary basis because the
Journal has found support amongst the members of our legal commu-
nity. We solicit your support through the submission of articles or
initiation of a yearly subscription to guarantee receipt of subsequent
issues. Questions or manuscripts should be addressed to the editorial
staff c/o Western State University Law Review Association, 16485
Laguna Canyon Road, Irvine, California 92718.
WILLIAM R. FOWLER
Editor-in-Chief, 1993
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Charity Begins at Home: Alternatives
in Nonprofit Regulation
Jon Garon*
INTRODUCTION
We are not unaware that the giving of alms has long been consid-
ered virtuous in our Western tradition. In antiquity the humanist
and jurist, Cicero, said of Caesar: "Of all thy virtues none is more
marvelous and graceful than charity." Some centuries later the
Christian thinker, Augustine of Hippo, observed that it is essential
to the virtue that "charity obeys reason, so that charity is vouch-
safed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, when we give to the
needy." In Medieval times the Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimon-
ides, espoused a charity such that no contribution should be made
without the donor feeling confident that the administration is hon-
est, prudent and capable of management.'
Throughout the last decade, public perception towards charity
has changed as church leaders were sentenced to jail for robbing their
own congregants,2 controversies plagued art and cultural institutions,3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law, Irvine, California,
J.D. Columbia University School of Law; B.A. University of Minnesota. Professor Garon
teaches courses on Corporations, Art & Entertainment, and Charitable Institutions. He also
lectures on the subject of not-for-profit theatre and has been an active board and committee
member on a number of local and national charitable organizations.
The author wishes to thank Stacy Blumberg Garon, Esq. for her invaluable assistance, sug-
gestions and support in the preparation of this article.
1. Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146,156 (2d. Cir.), Cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990).
2. The PTL Club founded by Jim Bakker had grown to over 2,000 employees and included
PTL Lodgings, a condominium resort complex which raised the religious charity over $158 mil-
lion dollars between 1984 and 1987. As a result of a sexual scandal with Bakker's secretary,
Jessica Hahn, the payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars in "hush money," and the result-
ing disclosure regarding the PTL operations, Bakker was convicted on twenty-four counts of
fraud and conspiracy. His forty-five year prison sentence was ultimately set aside, and the term
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and the head of United Way, America's largest umbrella funding
agency, was forced to resign amid scandal of excessive salary and pos-
sible improprieties.4 Adverse changes to charitable giving deductions
under the Federal Income Tax reflected the decreased faith in the
nonprofit sector and added to the difficulties of charitable
fundraising.5
Despite this crisis in confidence, reduced Federal funding and the
economic downturn have combined to reinvigorate the role of the
nonprofit agency. Crisis intervention for victims of Hurricane An-
drew in Florida, the flooding of the Mississippi in the Midwest, and
the personal crises of thousands of individuals facing unemployment,
have once again propelled charities into the forefront of public need
and public good.
Despite these more positive trends, the public view of charities
continues to decline. A poll conducted by the Gallup Organization in
September 1993, revealed that eighty-one percent of those surveyed
were either "very" or "somewhat" concerned about nonprofit expend-
reduced to eighteen years. George James, Bakker's 45-Year Prison Term Set Aside, THE N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991 at B6; Bakker Eligible for Parole in '85, THE ATLANTIC CONST., Aug. 23,
1991 at Al.
3. Contemporary Arts Center in Cincinnati and its director, Dennis Barrie, were charged
with violating local obscenity laws as the result of an exhibition of the work of artist Robert
Mapplethorpe. Mapplethorpe's exhibit of 175 photographs included seven homoerotic or sado-
masochistic photographs. Barrie and the museum were ultimately acquitted at jury trial of all
charges. Mary Schmich, Art Gallery, Director Not Guilty, Cincinnati Jurors Clear Both of Ob-
scenity Charges, Cmi. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1990 at 1.
A result of the charges and the surrounding public debate was an amendment to the Na-
tional Foundation of the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 954-955, to include stan-
dards of "decency." 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990). In 1992, this amendment was ruled
unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment for overbreadth. Finley v. National En-
dowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992). The Court found the restrictions
covered more than the government merely choosing not to subsidize a type of speech. Instead,
the obscenity restriction was found to be an impermissible restriction on First Amendment
rights, analogous to the recognized rights of academic freedom.
"Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of tran-
scendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned .... Artistic ex-
pression, no less than academic speech or journalism, is at the core of a democratic
society's cultural and political vitality. Congress recognized as much in establishing the
NEA." Id. at 1473.
4. Felicity Barringer, United Way Head Is Forced Out In Furor Over His Lavish Style, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992 at Al. As events unfolded, William Aramony recognized no improprieties,
but did acknowledge the effect of the scandal and his forced resignation. "I do apologize for any
problems my lack of sensitivity to perceptions has caused [United Way]," Aramony said in re-
sponse to a demand for an apology from the head of the United Way of Georgia. Id.
5. The 1984 Tax Reform Act imposed strict regulations regarding the appraisal of charita-
ble contributions other than cash or publicly traded securities. 26 C.F.R. § 602 (1988). Rules
under the 1984 Tax Reform Act required detailed substantiation of the gift's appraisal value. 53
Fed. Reg. 16076 (1988), 26 C.F.R. Parts I and 602. The changes also disallowed the deduction of
the appreciation of certain property, such as art, unless the use of such property was directly
related to the charitable purpose of the organization. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) (1988). In Congress, the
1984 Tax Reform Act restrictions on deductions for donated art have been repealed. I.R.C.
§ 170(e)(1)(B)(i) (1992).
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itures "not directly related to their stated mission."'6 Two out of three
of the persons surveyed believe that charities do not provide enough
information for contributors to make informed decisions, and seventy-
five percent believe that "mandatory regulation" is required.7 The
survey indicates that most respondents do not intend this mandatory
regulation to be government involvement, but rather a new form of
watchdog agency or other solution.8 The public does not want direct
government intervention, but it wants credibility and integrity
restored.
What is necessary for the next decade is a new model of nonprofit
support and regulation which serves to encourage agency responsibil-
ity; to increase donor participation in policing the agency's activities;
and to promote charitable giving to those agencies which are effi-
ciently run and support worthwhile causes. Such a model must also
address concerns of the State and Federal governments' fears of in-
creased fraud, as well as respond to those who criticize the role of the
nonprofit sector. Such a model may be difficult to implement, but it
can be developed.
I. THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR REFORM
The push to change the nonprofit sector's self-regulation stems
from a number of discrete areas. Because of the excess of the 1980s,
the image of major charities has been badly tarnished. In sentencing
Jim Bakker for the PTL scandal, Federal District Judge Robert Potter
said "[t]hose of us who do have a religion are sick of being saps for
money-grubbing preachers and priests." Judge Potter aptly summa-
rized the public sentiment towards the televangelist industry.9
In one of the most embarrassing of the charitable scandals, Wil-
liam Aramony, president of United Way of America, was forced to
resign amid charges of excessive salary, inappropriate fringe benefits
and questionable management practices. 10 Press reports described
6. Sean Mehegan, Gallup Poll: Most Favor More Oversight of Charities, NONPROFIT
TIMES, Oct. 1993 at 6.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. James, supra, note 2, at B6. Judge Potter's comments also led to a reduction in the
sentence to 18 years. In setting aside the verdict, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals panel held
that Potter allowed his own religious sense to be reflected in the harsh sentence, commenting
that the court "cannot sanction sentencing procedures that create the perception of the bench as
a pulpit from which judges announce their personal sense of religiosity and simultaneously pun-
ish defendants for offending it." Id.
10. Barringer, supra, note 4, at Al. See also, Robert Kardon, Nonprofit Sector Falling from
Grace... United Way Controversy Impacts All Charities, Cal. Ass'n Nonprofits Alert, April/May
1992, at 1.
1993]
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Aramony's use of first class travel, a $463,000 income package, a ques-
tionable relationship with an affiliated agency run by Aramony's son
and the use of a chauffeured limousine service as instances of non-
profit abuse." These accusations shook the foundations of United
Way. Some local United Way chapters withdrew from the national
organization while many others reduced or eliminated donations to
the national organization.1 2
In response, Robert Kardon, the executive director of the Cali-
fornia Association of Nonprofits, wrote
"[t]he charges against Aramony and the United Way of America's
arrogant reaction to demands for answers from local United Ways,
the public, and press are terrible violations of the nonprofit mission.
The long-term effect of this controversy, I believe, will be a loss of
public trust in all charitable organizations.'
13
Kardon called for charities to voluntarily and aggressively dis-
close information, to help rebuild the public trust, and to show that
the employees in the nonprofit sector are "motivated by caring and
giving."' 14 According to Kardon, "[tihese are the people working un-
selfishly for a just and equitable society."' 5 Kardon is not alone. Ger-
ald Kaufman, co-chairman of the National Council of Nonprofit
Associations believes that nonprofits are actually encouraging addi-
tional regulation.' 6 "It's more than Tammy Faye Bakker and the
United Way," Kaufman believes. "The media is coming after [the
nonprofit sector], and we'd better be forthcoming. Otherwise, there
will be more regulation."' 17
For Kardon and many people involved in charitable activities,
better disclosure is simply another tool to encourage charitable agen-
cies to show how honest, proper and positive these agencies actually
are. A second, unspoken benefit of greater disclosure laws is to force
the few rotten apples out of the barrel.
11. Kardon, supra, note 10, at 4.
12. In Milwaukee, for example, the local chapter voted to rejoin the national organization
after a one-year absence brought on by the Aramony revelations and resignation. Milwaukee
United Way Rejoins National Group, CH. TRia., Apr. 15, 1993, at 3.
Press reports in Spring of 1993 showed only half of the 1,400 local United Way chapters had
continued to contribute to United Way of America. See, Charles Shepard, A Year Later, United
Way Still Faces Investigations, Morale Problems, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1993 at A4. Even ac-
cording to the new President, Elaine Chao, only 967 local chapters had pledged as of Apr. 1993.
Valerie Finholm, Lender Vows Better United Way, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 17, 1993 at B5.
13. Kardon, supra, note 10, at 1.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id.
16. Mehegan, supra, note 6, at 6.
17. Id.
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At the June 1993 hearings before the House Ways and Means
Oversight Subcommittee, new legislative suggestions were being de-
veloped to address the growing "problem." Despite the hearings and
the call for action by Jake Pickle, the Democratic chairman of the sub-
committee, witnesses from the Internal Revenue Service and the Bet-
ter Business Bureau were reluctant to agree with Congressman
Pickle's assessment regarding the existence or scope of the problem.',
Among Pickle's concerns were the salaries paid to top executives at
the nation's largest charitable agencies, including some of the largest
hospitals. Pickle said excessive salaries "raise serious questions about
what he described as 'the fastest-growing section in the U.S. econ-
omy,' the 1.2 million nonprofit organizations that the IRS has de-
clared exempt from paying federal income taxes."'19
In response, Bennett M. Weiner of the Better Business Bureau
tried to paint a different picture of the salaries paid in the nonprofit
sector. Weiner said that his survey of 203 of the largest charities, ex-
cluding hospitals and universities, "does not suggest widespread
abuses," and only nine pay a top salary in excess of $250,000.20 The
perception problem remains, however, since the top salary in 1991
went to Aramony before he was forced to resign.
A second voice in the call for reform is that of the state attorneys
general. Like the House Ways and Means Committee, many state at-
torneys general see a need for greater regulation and stricter control.
Richard Blumenthal, chairman of a charitable solicitation committee
for the National Association of Attorneys General, and the Attorney
General of Connecticut, was recently quoted in Time Magazine as say-
ing that "[there has been a dramatic increase in abuses and com-
plaints in every state that actively monitors nonprofits and charities
over the past five years."'21 As the Time article illustrates, the number
of criminal enterprises perpetrating fraud under the cloak of charita-
ble respectability appears to have increased dramatically. It remains
uncertain and undocumented whether such appearances reflect an ac-
tual increase in criminal activity, an increase in enforcement in the
nonprofit sector, or an increase in the negative perception the public
holds for charitable fundraisers. Statistical evidence on increased
criminal or fraudulent activity by tax exempt agencies has not been
forthcoming. The anecdotal evidence cited in Congress, the Aramony
18. See, Bill McAllister, Charities Scored on Hill for CEO Pay, Perks, WASH. Posr, June 16,
1993 at A4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Adam Zagorin, Remember the Greedy, TIME, Aug. 16, 1993 at 36.
1993]
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resignation and an increased cynicism have left the states in a no-win
situation. To regulate the charitable agencies more tightly is to make
fundraising for churches, civic groups and the police booster agencies
more difficult and expensive. 22 The failure to regulate opens the state
to charges that the most vulnerable of individuals, the naive, public-
spirited donors, are being thrown to the wolves. The victims in this
debate are the needy: those people helped by the good work of the
charities who find donations drying up as a result of the bad press,
while money that should have gone to provide services is being re-
routed to line criminals' pockets or support the lifestyles of pampered
senior executives.
The difficult financial position of the Federal government and
many state governments has also created a momentum for change.
The need to balance the state and federal budgets has focused a strong
spotlight on any potential source of new revenue. If the government
has found itself forced to cut assistance programs to save money, there
are few moral prohibitions about eliminating tax exemptions for those
same programs, which thereby generates new sources of income as a
result. This is not a motivation which has been officially endorsed by
any of the state or federal regulators, but Representative Pickle and
other House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee members con-
tinue to address the increasingly large role the nonprofit sector plays
in the U.S. economy, while eyeing those tax sources wistfully. In gov-
ernment hearings, there is a sense that the money should not be left in
the hands of self-appointed committees and organizations. Since
money is very short, the argument goes, the money should return to
the government, which can best decide what are the nation's
priorities.
Revenue can be seen as a large factor in the discussion of the
Unrelated Business Income Tax ("UBI Tax"), a separate tax placed
on tax exempt organizations for income which is not received through
the organization's tax exempt activities.23 Internal Revenue Code
§ 513 requires that income derived from business which is regularly
carried on and that is not substantially related to the organization's
exempt purpose is subject to income tax.24 Prior to the enactment of
22. For example, in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S.
781 (1988), Amici briefs were filed to protect the right to solicit without such disclosure by over
thirty fraternal police associations as well as an equally large number of national charities. See
infra note 100 for listing.
23. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (1969) defines the UBI Tax as "the gross income derived by any or-
ganization from any unrelated trade or business... regularly carried on by it, less the [allowed]
deductions."
24. I.R.C. § 513(a) (1969).
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§ 513, such income was tax free as part of the organization's exempt
purpose so long as the income was used for the charitable purposes of
the organization. Under § 513, however, not only does the use of the
income have to meet the operational test of the organization, but so
does the source of the income. 25 This section of the tax code has
spawned a tremendous amount of litigation and regulation governing
what types of activities are regularly carried on and which are substan-
tially related.
The effect of the UBI Tax is to further limit the available sources
of funds for tax exempt agencies which are free from tax. One ration-
ale behind the tax is to provide a level playing field for commercial
businesses which compete with the nonprofits in the sales of similar
merchandise or services. The other reason to continue expanding the
scope of the UBI Tax is to increase state and federal revenue without
directly increasing taxes on the public. In a 1989 speech before the
Business Coalition for Fair Competition, representative Richard
Schulze of the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee
urged a continued push to increase the scope and enforcement of the
UBI Tax. Schulze pointed out that the revenues had "tripled since the
matter [gained] attention. '26 After focusing his remarks on the reve-
nue impact of the tax, however, he retreated from the UBI Tax as a
simple revenue tool. "Fight for it because it is right, not because it
raises more money," Schulze told the Business Coalition for Fair
Competition.27
With the increased need to find new sources of taxable income,
the need to protect the public from increasingly clever fraud schemes,
the heightened visibility of notorious excesses at the nation's top fund-
raising organization, and the need to fulfill the public perception that
something must be done, new federal and state regulatory schemes
are in the works. Unfortunately, few of these needs for new regula-
tion are based on the need of the public to increase the efficiency and
safety of the nonprofit sector. Increased efficiency and reduced risks
of fraud should be the goal of any new regulation.
25. I.R.C. § 513(a) includes the disclaimer that "the need of such organization for income or
funds or the use it makes of the profits derived" is not income which is substantially related to
the exempt purpose and therefore treated as taxable income.
26. Richard Schulze, No Major Changes in UBIT Law This Year, Rep. Schulze Predicts,
reprinted in BNA WASHINGTON INSIDER, March 16, 1989, at 1.
27. Id.
19931
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II. EXISTING REGULATION: WHAT HAS BEEN TRIED
The typical nonprofit agency is a corporation28 formed under
State law in the same fashion as the traditional "for-profit" corpora-
tion. The nonprofit corporation is distinct from the for-profit corpora-
tion in that the purpose clause of the articles of incorporation must
state a charitable corporate purpose, 29 and all assets are dedicated to
this charitable purpose. If a nonprofit corporation dissolves, the as-
sets must be pledged to another recognized charity.30 Regulation of
nonprofit agencies is provided at both the state and federal level,
although federal regulation is limited to the role of the Internal Reve-
nue Service.
A. Federal Regulation and the IRS
Being a nonprofit corporation is distinct from having tax exempt
status. The privilege of operating without paying certain State and
Federal taxes is limited to select organizations, including those which
provide the educational, charitable or religious services enumerated in
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code31 as well other cate-
28. The agencies may also be trusts, partnerships or unincorporated associations. E.g., CAL.
CORP. CODE § 5130 et. seq. (Deering 1993); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 125 § 2 (1993); TEx.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. § 1396-50.01 (West 1993).
29. Often the state nonprofit regulations will recite the definition of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) re-
garding the organization's charitable, educational, scientific or literary purposes. Some states,
such as California, simply require "charitable purposes" and govern the different types of chari-
table purposes separately, including public benefit organizations, CAL. COR. CODE. § 5111
(Deering 1993), mutual benefit corporations, CAL. CORP. CODE § 7111 (Deering 1993), and reli-
gious organizations, CAL. CORP. CODE § 9111 (Deering 1993). New York has four types of non-
profits, but classifies religious and other § 501(c)(3) organizations together as "Type B," which
includes "charitable, educational, religious, scientific, literary, cultural or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals." N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROF-T CORP. LAW § 201(b) Type B (McKinney
1993). Other states separate charitable from religious (MINN. STAT. § 315 et. seq. (1993)) and
still others treat all charities, including religious organizations, the same for state law purposes.
See further ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 103.05 (1993) (listing thirty types of nonprofit corpora-
tions under the same statute); PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (1993).
30. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1993). Some state laws require a similar provision for all assets or
for assets dedicated to a specific purpose, such as those "legally required to be used for a particu-
lar purpose ('cy-pres'-type assets)." N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFrr CORP. LAW § 1005 (Revisor's Notes,
Comment (a)) (McKinney 1993); ILL. REV. STATE. ch. 32, para. 112.16 (1993); MINN. STAT.
§ 317A.735 (1992); PA. CONS. STAT. § 5976 (1993).
31. Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of
its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candi-
date for public office. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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gories of more narrowly defined tax exempt organizations. 32 Many
types of organizations may be nonprofit and still not qualify for tax
exempt status. 33 Federal regulation for the nonprofit sector is based
on this tax exemption and limited to the corporation's taxable and
non-taxable activities. An organization may lose its tax exempt status,
but will not be forced into automatic dissolution as a result.34
To achieve tax exempt status, an exemption application must be
filed with the Internal Revenue Service and similar forms must be
filed with the appropriate State tax authorities. The Form 990 tax re-
turn must be filed annually and must be available to the public at the
office of the charitable agency.35 A key element of the tax return is
the detailed salary paid to each of the agency's top five employees. 36
Because such information is considered very sensitive, agencies are
often less than forthright in disclosing the information included in the
Form 990 or making the form available to the public. In "Warehouses
of Wealth, ' 37 a survey of 6,000 nonprofit agencies showed that many
32. The other organizations must meet certain criteria, including that the institution is not
organized for profit and no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private individ-
ual, and any benefits to individuals in such organizations are limited to the charitable purpose of
the organization. Specific exemptions are available for the following: Civic leagues or local em-
ployee associations. § 501(c)(4); Labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations. § 501(c)(5);
Business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional
football leagues. § 501(c)(6); Clubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable
purposes. §§ 501(c)(7), 501(c)(10); Certain fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations.
§ 501(c)(8); Voluntary employees' beneficiary associations. § 501(c)(9); Teachers' retirement
fund associations. § 501(c)(11); Certain benevolent life insurance associations. § 501(c)(12);
Nonprofit cemetery companies. § 501(c)(13); Nonprofit credit unions. § 501(c)(14); Insurance
companies other than life if the net written premiums for the taxable year do not exceed
$350,000. § 501(c)(15); Regulated crop financing corporations. § 501(c)(16); Selected trusts
forming part of a plan providing for the payment of supplemental unemployment compensation
benefits. §§ 501(c)(17), 501(c)(18); Military auxiliary units or societies. § 501(c)(19); Qualified
legal services plan. § 501(c)(20); Qualified Black Lung Acts trusts. § 501(c)(21); Qualified multi-
employer plans. § 501(c)(22); Certain veterans benefits association organized before 1880.
§ 501(c)(23); Qualified trusts under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
§ 501(c)(24); and certain corporations organized to acquire and hold real property for another
§ 501(c) organization. § 501(c)(25).
33. For example, social clubs which maintain written discrimination policies. I.R.C.
§ 501(i). Other general categories of companies which are not organized for private gain and are
still ineligible for tax exempt status include political organizations and fraternal organizations
which provide life or health insurance benefits.
34. See, e.g., Incorporated Trustees of Gospel Workers Soc'y v. United States, 510 F. Supp.
374 (D.C. Cir. 1981) affd mem., 672 F.2d 894, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982) (publisher lost tax
exempt status for publishing religious literature after it stopped missionary work and limited its
operation to publication of commercial, though religious, literature, retained large profits, and
greatly increased employee salary).
35. I.R.C. § 6104(e)(1)(A)-(B) (1987). The Form 990 is also available from the IRS for
public inspection. 26 C.F.R. 601.702 (1992). Certain organizations may be exempt from the
Form 990 filing requirement, and churches (including certain religiously affiliated organizations)
are precluded from filing. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2) (1987).
36. Id.
37. Warehouses of Wealth was originally printed as a series of six articles in the Philadelphia
Inquirer. The series has been collected and expanded into the upcoming paperback Warehouses
of Wealth: The Tax-Free Economy by Gilbert Gaul and Neill Borowski, which is predicted to
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agencies either omitted this information or found improper ways to
discourage or eliminate the availability of the Form 990 to members
and contributors.38 The results of this survey indicate a continuing
problem in achieving disclosure of the existing requirements.
Under current law, the enforcement powers of the IRS are
limited. Assuming that errors or under-reporting do not rise to the
level of criminal misconduct, the IRS has only the option of terminat-
ing the nonprofit tax status of the organization. Because this is such a
drastic step, essentially the death penalty for the organization, the IRS
is left with few alternatives. At the urging of Representative Pickle,
the IRS Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson is developing
new restrictions aimed at nonprofit agencies. One of her priorities is a
set of new sanctions in the form of a five percent excise tax, which
would allow the IRS to penalize an organization without having to
resort to challenging its tax exempt status.39 While this suggestion
may assist the IRS and resolve the dilemma faced by the agency, it will
not address the central concerns of increasing efficiency, eliminating
fraud and restoring public confidence.
Since the primary purpose of the IRS is to collect income for the
government, it is not the best policing agency for charitable activities.
Unfortunately, the IRS has earned this obligation by default.
Although beyond the scope of this article, the role of the IRS as a
federal police force deserves greater examination. In addition, if the
excise tax evolves into a revenue source like the UBI Tax, it will be-
come a potent tool for the IRS to use to raise income and penalize
charities, a result which may not have been intended.
B. Traditional Forms of Corporate Regulation
All the traditional tools available for state regulation of business
activities and control of criminal conduct are available to control the
affairs of nonprofit corporations just as they are for any other business
practice. Despite this, there remains a need for supplemental regula-
tion in the nonprofit business sector.
The need for greater supervision over nonprofit agencies flows
from the sources of corporate control available for the for-profit sec-
have the potential to do "to the non-profit sector what Sinclair's The Jungle did to the meatpack-
ing industry." Bruce D. Collins, So You Say You Want a Revolution? It's Coming, Corporate
Legal Times, Sept. 1993 at 6.
38. Gilbert Gaul and Neill Borowski, Warehouses of Wealth, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
quoted in Bruce Collins, Don't Try to Thwart Public Demand for 990 Disclosure, Corporate
Legal Times, July 1993 at 6.
39. McAllister, Charities Scored supra, note 18, at A4.
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tor. While a variety of factors exist to control and monitor the con-
duct of business managers, there are five primary sources of corporate
control: "(1) the proxy contest, (2) the takeover bid, (3) the derivative
action, (4) public monitoring by the SEC and (5) the appraisal rem-
edy."4 Of these five primary mechanisms of corporate control,
neither the takeover bid nor the appraisal remedy are available. As
will be discussed below, the other mechanisms may also suffer in the
translation into the nonprofit sector.
1. Absence of Appraisals and Take-Overs in Nonprofits
Both takeovers and appraisals are based on the financial stake of
the shareholder. Unlike a shareholder, a donor cannot have any fi-
nancial interest in the corporation.41 The articles of incorporation for
every charitable agency require that all income is permanently dedi-
cated to charity and that no dividends or other income 42 be paid for
the private gain of any individual.4 3 As a result, there is no financial
self-interest to protect for the members or donors of an organization.
Money spent is gone. A disgruntled donor may refuse to renew her
contribution, but with few exceptions, neither appraisal nor take-over
remedies apply. Since there is no financial interest, no appraisal or
other method of valuation can stop existing management from their
course of conduct in and of itself.
2. Derivative Actions by the Nonprofit Membership
The derivative action allows shareholders to pursue rights of the
corporation when the corporate board of directors has failed to do so.
In both theory and practice, this remedy is available to any charity
which operates under a membership structure. Subject to limits of
state law, this cause of action will be available to provide standing for
members of an organization to sue on the company's behalf.44 The
40. WILLIAM KLEIN AND JOHN COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZAT1ON AND FINANCE, 177,
Foundation Press (5th ed. 1993). The accountability mechanisms also include other methods,
including fraud, state securities regulation, and shareholders' inspections. Id.
41. An exception to this general rule exists for those nonprofit organizations which have
financed projects with debt securities sold to their members, such as charitable bonds. While
such donors do not have an interest in the dividends or profits of the corporation, they do have
an interest in the repayment of principal and interest. Such rights, however, do not give rise to
an ownership stake in the company that could create a corporate takeover or result in an ap-
praisal remedy.
42. Other than reasonable salary.
43. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5130(b) (Deering 1993); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 112.16
(1993); N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 515(a) (McKinney 1993); PA. CONS. STAT. § 5551
(1993); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 1396-1.02 (West 1993).
44. Such standing is not universally available to all donors of organizations. It is generally
recognized that a member of an organization has the standing to sue derivatively on the corpora-
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membership can use the derivative action to force a company to pur-
sue rights such as collection of pledges or enforcement of contracts
which the board of directors had elected not to pursue.
Such power disappears, however, if the charity is organized under
a law which provides for non-membership agencies. Many corpora-
tions which have wide public support do not have an actual member-
ship. In such cases, the standing to sue is further weakened or
eliminated. In Lewis v. Anclote Manor Hospital, Inc.,45 an employee
and contributor was found to have no standing to bring derivative ac-
tion on behalf of a nonprofit hospital against the board of directors for
alleged improprieties and transactions which did not support its tax
exempt status. Similarly, in Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal In-
surance Company,46 creditors sued the bankrupt company derivatively
on the theory that any recovery by the corporation from its directors
would go to the creditors since there was no membership. The court
acknowledged the member's right to a derivative action but would not
extend the right to the creditors. "Louisiana establishes a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary obligations and mismanagement by cor-
porate officers and directors who are grossly negligent in the perform-
ance of their duties. This cause of action, however, runs solely in
favor of the corporation and its shareholders - or, in the case of a
nonprofit corporation, the corporation and its members, if any. '47
The creditors of the bankrupt nonprofit corporation could not sue de-
rivatively, and because the corporation had no membership, no
outside party (except perhaps the state attorney general) would have
standing to sue the board of directors.48
Membership derivative suits are not a common or popular
method of nonprofit regulation, but they serve an important purpose.
The specter of judicial scrutiny adds a reminder to both the organiza-
tion and the organization's board of directors that no one is free to
violate the rights of the charity or its members. The lack of standing
tion's behalf. E.g., Kidwell ex. rel. Penfold v Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1979) ("There
are several means by which these beneficiaries' interests might possibly be protected, including
(1) a class action; (2) a suit by the corporation, either directly or derivatively by members; and
(3) a suit by a willing attorney general." However, the court found no such right to a derivative
action by the directors themselves.) See also, Kirtley v. McLelland, 562 N.E. 2d 27 (1990) (mem-
ber of nonprofit condominium cooperative had standing to bring derivative action against board
of directors).
Such a right may be limited by statute. For example, under N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP.
LAW § 623, the derivative plaintiff must represent 5% of the outstanding membership. Hoffert
v. Dank, 55 A.D. 2d 518, 389 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1976).
45. 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16109 (M.D.FI 1987).
46. 858 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988), reh den'd 864 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 239.
48. 846 F.2d at 1153.
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for non-membership organizations removes this possible scrutiny and
the self-regulation it encourages.
3. The Proxy Fight and the Membership Meeting
For membership organizations, the proxy fight or the fight at the
annual membership meeting may be the most effective mechanism to
transfer control from one segment of the organization to another.
Like the for-profit counterpart, voting battles are not particularly sim-
ple or efficient, except in comparison to litigation. Nonetheless, they
serve an important function to encourage involvement and remind en-
trenched management that there exists a mechanism for corporate re-
form which may be invoked at any time.
The nonprofit battle at the ballot box will fare better than its for-
profit counterpart. Shareholder democracy suffers from the ability of
the shareholder to "vote with her feet" and sell rather than stay with a
company to change the corporate course. A nonprofit member does
not have that option. Unlike the shareholder who is primarily con-
cerned with maximizing an investment, the donor is concerned with
maximizing the impact of a contribution. While the member may
elect to drop membership, there is no economic incentive to do so.
The donor's gift cannot be rescinded. The money spent on prior
membership years will be lost, and a failure to remain involved has the
effect of decreasing the importance or effectiveness of that member-
ship. Therefore, the only way to maximize the gift is to become per-
sonally involved.
A second reason the nonprofit vote should be more effective than
the for-profit version is that no single shareholder can control any
block of votes. In the typical membership organization, every mem-
ber is entitled to vote. While many charities have classes of member-
ship, voting memberships are often granted to donors at either the
lowest or at relatively low levels of support. Votes do not accrue to
larger donors proportionally. 49 The largest shareholder of a for-profit
corporation can dominate the board of directors, but no member can
dominate the vote of the membership (at least not as directly). Since
"one-person, one-vote" governs most membership organizations, an
49. This does not suggest that influence may not be increased by increasing the size of the
donation. The professional staff at any charity can be expected to give the largest donors a
tremendous amount of deference and respect with regard to the wishes those donors have for
their funds. There is nothing implicitly improper in this. A donor may have a right to say how
the charitable donation is used and is often solicited for specific purposes. Voting rights, how-
ever, are not generally granted as a function of donation size. As a result, the large donor does
not carry the same amount of clout or control as the large shareholder in a for-profit
corporation.
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organized segment of the corporation can sway votes on those matters
properly before the membership.
The question remains, however, as to what may motivate a non-
profit membership to take matters into its own hands. Instead of
share prices as a motivating factor, the typical membership will be
roused from its complacency only when contributions are down or
services are no longer being provided.
Reductions in contributions may be caused by general ineffi-
ciency, a sudden loss of credibility with the public, or the disaffection
of key contributors. If credibility is suddenly eroded, the cause of the
erosion may also motivate the membership to take matters into its
own hands.
It must be noted that the relationship between the members, the
board of directors and the officers may be different than that of for-
profit shareholders with their boards of directors and officers. While
most for-profit directors are "insiders," officers or shareholders with a
financial stake, nonprofits are structured slightly differently. The
board of directors in a well organized charity will have a majority of
volunteer board members.50 Only a minority of the board will be
professional, paid staff members. At the membership meeting, the
composition of the board of directors can be changed, but the employ-
ment of the professional officers will not be directly addressed. New
volunteer leadership may have the desired impact of changing the na-
ture of the professional operations, but a risk remains that no effective
changes can be implemented by new volunteer leadership without
completely removing the existing professional staff.
The second cause of dissatisfaction results from a lack of services
coming from the charity. In no place is this more evident than in the
health care industry. Throughout the country, eyebrows are being
raised and legislation written to address the problem of nonprofit hos-
pitals which continue to receive significant tax benefits while no
longer providing any significant charitable health services.
In a recent editorial in the Boston Globe, Boston area hospitals
were castigated for financial practices which grossly understated their
reserves while these same hospitals cut back on services to the needy,
the uninsured and inner-city communities. 51 Boston is not alone.
50. Occasionally, this may be the result of state law as well. The board must be comprised
of a majority of disinterested directors under the California public benefit corporations statute.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 (Deering 1993). This restriction applies only to public benefit corpora-
tions and does not apply to mutual benefit and religious corporations.
51. The Wealth of Hospitals, Boston Globe, May 9, 1993 at A6 (editorial). The editorial
cites a study by Nancy Kane of the Harvard School of Public Health which identifies "enormous
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In Texas, the battle has gone one step further. A court fight won
by the local hospital was lost to new state law. The Methodist Hospi-
tal in Houston won a court victory, after the Texas Attorney General
brought an action to have the hospital's tax exempt status revoked.5 2
The trial court held that the use of the charity's reserves were not at
issue and the hospital was within the applicable charitable guide-
lines.53 Methodist Hospital lost the war, however, and on September
1, 1993 a new revenue statute went into effect which requires that
nonprofit hospitals donate a proportion of their income to indigent
care or other community benefits.5 4 According to Texas Attorney
General Dan Morales, the statute "holds nonprofit hospitals account-
able to the public for the millions of dollars in tax-exemptions they
receive. '55 Morales agreed not to appeal the Methodist Hospital deci-
sion after the hospital obligated itself to begin making payments to the
indigent care fund immediately.56
Hospitals and other charities are fighting similar battles through-
out the country. In School District of the City of Erie v. Hamot Medi-
cal Center,57 Erie, Pennsylvania successfully challenged the hospital's
real estate tax exemption. Hamot Medical is a large hospital and
either directly or through related companies, it owns the local marina,
a senior housing project and substantial real estate.58 The court re-
viewed an extensive record, and rejected Hamot Medical's claim to a
continued tax exemption because the hospital operated on a profit-
motive basis.59 The court rejected the argument that the hospital pro-
vided charity through its community education and its health care for
the needy. "Hamot's community education programs and giveaways
were nothing but "loss-leaders" offered to attract customers for higher
financial resources in some [Boston] area hospitals." According to the editorial, "[t]he sums
cited are so vast that they warrant analysis by a select government commission."
52. Texas v. Methodist Hosp., (No. 494, 212) (1993).
53. Sandy Lutz, Charity Care and the Law: Methodist Hospital of Houston Wins a Round in
the Tax Exemption Fight, but Not-For-Profits Face More Challenges from State, Local Govern-
ments, Mod. Health Care, March 8, 1993 at 26.
54. 1993 TEX. GEN. LAWS § 360. The new law provides: "A nonprofit hospital shall pro-
vide health care services to the community and shall comply with all federal, state and local
government requirements for tax exemption in order to maintain such exemption. These health
care services to the community shall include charity care and government-sponsorea indigent
health care and may include other components of community benefits ...." TEX. ALS § 360-
311.043. The law also requires that the hospital have an indigent admission policy and a commu-
nity-wide needs assessment. Tex. ALS 360-311.044 (1993).
55. Daniel Moskowitz, Strapped Governments Eye Nonprofit Hospitals, Med. and Health,
Aug. 1, 1993.
56. AG, Methodist Hospital Reach Agreement, Texas Lawyer, June 7, 1993 at 46.
57. 602 A. 2d 407 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1992).
58. Id. at 410.
59. Id. at 414.
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paying items," the court found.6 Regarding the claim of indigent
care, the court chided the hospital that it "accepts defeat only after
collection and execution processes fail to yield fruit. [Hamot's] char-
ity is determined when the debt is deemed uncollectible, not prospec-
tively upon admittance.1 61 Due in large part to the commercial
attitude found at the hospital, the organization was required to pay
local real estate taxes.
The results of this growing public perception are causing state of-
ficials to take action, but in membership organizations they can also
provide an incentive for an aggressive reassessment by the member-
ship. The same cannot be said for the non-membership organization.
For hospitals which have no "membership," the lack of standing to
bring a derivative suit62 results in the same lack of proxy-type control
of the board of directors. There is no one with standing to vote
against the incumbent's policies of increasing wealth and decreasing
services. It should be noted, however, that the health care industry is
somewhat unique in the current national debate on the role of non-
profit and for-profit providers. The perceived evils of hospital eco-
nomics is part of the larger call for health care reform. As an industry
under intense scrutiny, salaries and services are being watched more
closely than in any other industry today.
Whatever the industry, for serious misconduct to take place, both
the paid staff and the volunteer leadership must be implicated. Either
through active participation, or through failure to become aware of
the operations of the organization, both lay leadership and profes-
sional leadership must have a hand in the wrongdoing. Once the im-
proprieties have become public knowledge, the membership can act to
remove the old board of directors and bring in "reformers" who will
work to renew the organization. To be effective, however, this action
must be taken quickly and decisively before all public goodwill has
been eroded.
All of the proxy and derivative action mechanisms are contingent
on the activity of the interested membership. While this is a valid
mechanism when available, many organizations are formed without a
membership or other voting population. Instead, the board of direc-
tors nominates and elects the subsequent board of directors. This re-
lationship has obvious self-dealing implications. A board comprised
of self-selecting directors can perpetuate itself without concern that
60. Id
61. Id.
62. See generally, Lewis, 858 F.2d 233 n. 46 and accompanying text.
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donors will rebel and throw them out. Just as the lack of a member-
ship creates a lack of standing to sue on the part of donors to redress
the wrongs suffered by the corporation, 63 the lack of an annual mem-
bership meeting and the right of interested members to call special
meetings eliminates any self-regulatory mechanism from the nonprofit
agency.
For the membership agency, however, membership meetings
should serve to increase the visibility of issues and encourage more
frank and open discussions. In these organizations, the existing mech-
anism should be encouraged, and new suggestions for nonprofit gov-
ernance can utilize this existing protection to further encourage the
charity's responsibility to the community.
4. Existing State Regulation
Because of the lack of traditional corporate governing controls
for non-membership charities, state regulation has become the pri-
mary source of nonprofit control. State regulation takes the place of
the corporate securities regulation,64 and serves to add an additional
layer of protection to the public. Much of this regulation has cen-
tered on the methods of fundraising and the role of professional fund-
raising solicitors or consultants. As the Attorneys General for the
states of Maine and Connecticut explain in the Amici Curiae brief for
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,65 "[S tate regulation of chari-
table solicitations generally serves one of two (or perhaps both) strong
state interests: the prevention of fraud by charities and professional
fundraisers and the dissemination of information to potential donors
so they can make informed decisions as to whether to contribute. '66
In this way, the state regulation serves as a replacement for traditional
securities laws at both the state and federal level. Federal securities
regulations govern the dissemination of full and fair disclosure of ma-
terial information, 67 while state securities laws, in the form of "blue
63. See note 45, supra, and accompanying text.
64. See note 70, infra.
65. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). See Riley, infra at 93.
66. Brief of the Amici Curiae, States of Maine and Connecticut in Support of Appellants,
Riley v. Lighthouse for the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328) (hereinaf-
ter "Maine Brief").
67. The Securities Act of 1933 was formulated under the philosophy espoused by Justice
Louis Brandeis that "sunshine is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most effi-
cient policeman." Larry Soderquist, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 2 (Practicing L.
Inst. 2d Ed. 1990), citing Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 29 (1959). Such disclosure may be indirect in nature. Such disclosure serves a
remedial purpose of holding the transaction up to the light of scrutiny, even if such disclosure
only serves to "push issuers to fair, honest transactions." hi. at 103.
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sky laws," regulate the substantive fairness of the offering.68 The logic
behind this two-pronged regulatory scheme has led states to create
statutes which requires both substantive review of the charity's finan-
cial structure and full disclosure to the potential donor regarding the
solicitation fees.
In pronouncing a new statutory scheme for regulation of charita-
ble solicitation, the California legislature's statement of findings estab-
lishes a clear goal for the most recent types of state legislation:
The [California] Legislature finds that there exists in the area of
solicitations and sales, solicitations for charitable purposes a condi-
tion which has worked fraud, deceit and imposition upon the people
of the state which existing legal remedies are inadequate to correct.
Many solicitations or sales solicitations for charitable purposes have
involved situations where funds are solicited from the citizens of
this state for charitable purposes, but an insignificant amount, if
any, of the money solicited and collected actually is received by any
charity. The charitable solicitation industry has a significant impact
upon the well-being of the people of this state.69
These findings state the fundamental presumption of a large
number of states that fundraising, in general, and professional solicita-
tion, in particular, are a growing source of fraud which is seemingly
immune from traditional fraud statutes.70 Many of these laws take the
form of permit requirements and disclosure of fundraising activities
prior to the commencement of fundraising. 71 In Schaumburg v. Citi-
zens for a Better Env't,72 a local permit requirement was challenged
before the United States Supreme Court because the permit require-
ments "among other things, contain '[s]atisfactory proof that at least
seventy-five percent of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used
68. The purpose of blue sky regulation "is to protect stockholders and the investing public
generally from fraudulent and worthless securities, and also, to some extent, to protect persons
dealing with, and creditors of, the corporations. 11 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5158 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (cita-
tions omitted).
69. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510(a) (West 1987).
70. For a comprehensive overview of state regulatory schemes, See Ellen Harris, Lynn S.
Holley & Christopher J. McCaffrey, Fundraising into the 19 9 0's: State Regulation of Charitable
Solicitation after Riley, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 571 (Summer 1990).
71. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510.3 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT.
§ 309.556 (1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 174-b & § 174-c (McKinney 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-
22-8 (Michie 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31c-16.1 (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.836 (1990);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-53-3.2 (1987).
The Illinois statute provided "[e]very charitable organization ... which solicits or intends to
solicit contributions from any person in the State by any means" must file a registration state-
ment with the Illinois Attorney General. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 5102(a) (1977). This
statute was declared unconstitutional in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
624 n.5 (1980). See following note and accompanying text.
72. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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directly for the charitable purpose of the organization.' ",73 Citizens
for a Better Environment, a nonprofit environmental group, chal-
lenged the ordinance on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds
after the Village of Schaumburg ("Village") denied the permit on the
grounds that CBE could not demonstrate that seventy-five percent of
its fundraising actually went to charitable purposes. The Court
quoted the 1939 case of Schneider v. State,74 to establish the tradition
that First Amendment protection attached to house-to-house canvass-
ing and solicitation, "holding that the city could not, in the name of
preventing fraudulent appeals, subject door-to-door advocacy and the
communication of views to the discretionary permit requirement. ' 75
The Court focused on the importance of the message presented by the
solicitor during the solicitation:
Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable
regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for
the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with in-
formative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for par-
ticular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or
social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of
such information and advocacy would likely cease. Canvassers in
such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for money.76
Thus, the Court recognized that the solicitation process is part of
the charitable activity, the activity of disseminating information re-
garding the charity and the importance of its objectives within the
community. The Court then reviewed the requirement that seventy-
five percent of all funds raised go directly to the charitable purposes
and found that this requirement was "a direct and substantial limita-
tion on protected activity."'77 The Village urged that it had an obliga-
tion to protect the public from "fraud, crime and undue annoyance,"
but the Court found that this concern was only "peripherally" ad-
dressed by the seventy-five percent limitation and struck down the
ordinance as overbroad. 7s
Despite the clear language in Schaumburg, cities and states con-
tinued to try restricting the fees paid to professional fundraisers to a
"reasonable" amount below 20 to 25 percent of the funds received.
The Supreme Court has since addressed this issue twice more. In Sec-
73. Id. at 624 (quoting SCHAUMBURG VILLAGE CODE ch. 22, § 22-20(g) (1975).
74. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
75. 444 U.S. at 628 (citing Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163-165).
76. Id. at 632.
77. Id. at 636.
78. Id.
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retary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 7 the Court reviewed
a Maryland statute which prohibited a charity from paying more than
twenty-five percent of the gross income raised during a solicitation to
the professional fundraiser. 80 The Court reviewed Schaumburg, ex-
plaining that the goal of preventing fraud was not accomplished by
capping the percentage of funds raised which could go to the profes-
sional solicitors.8 ' "The justification for the limitation was an assump-
tion that any organization using more than 25% of its receipts on
fundraising, salaries, and overhead was not charitable, but was a com-
mercial, for-profit enterprise. Any such enterprise that represented
itself as a charity thus was fraudulent."' 2 The Court then went on to
reject this argument, pointing out that one of the factors increasing
the costs of solicitation was the expense involved in "dissemination of
information, discussion, and advocacy of public issues, an activity
clearly protected by the First Amendment." 83
Unlike Schaumburg, the Maryland statute at issue in Munson
provided an administrative waiver of the 25% limitation if the charity
could demonstrate financial necessity.84 The Court rejected this modi-
fication as a sufficient remedy and again rejected the "mistaken prem-
ise that high solicitation costs are an accurate measure of fraud."'85
The Supreme Court addressed yet another statute which regu-
lated the fees paid to professional solicitors in Riley v. National Fed'n
of the Blind of N. C.86 Again the Court overturned a state statute
which regulated the fees paid to professional solicitors. 87 The North
79. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
80. Id. at 950, n.2. (citing MD. LAWS, ch. 787 (1982). § 103D(a)) provided:
A charitable organization other than a charitable salvage organization may not pay or
agree to pay as expenses in connection with any fundraising activity a total amount in
excess of 25 percent of the total gross income raised or received by reason of the fund-
raising activity. The Secretary of State shall, by rule or regulation in accordance with
the 'standard of accounting and fiscal reporting for voluntary health and welfare orga-
nizations' provide for the reporting of actual cost, and of allocations of expenses, of a
charitable organization into those which are in connection with a fund-raising activity
and those which are not. The Secretary of State shall issue rules and regulations to
permit a charitable organization to pay or agree to pay for expenses in connection with
a fund-raising activity more than 25% of its total gross income in those instances where
the 25% limitation would effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising
contributions.
81. 467 U.S. at 961.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See n. 80, supra.
85. 467 U.S. at 966. In the accompanying footnote the Court referenced the state legislative
purpose clause that the regulations "assure that contributions will be used to benefit the in-
tended purpose." Id at n.14. "The State's justification therefore may be read as an interest in
preventing mismanagement as well as fraud. The flaw in the statute, however, remains. The
percentage limitation is too imprecise a tool to achieve that purpose." Id.
86. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
87. Id. at 803.
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Carolina statutory scheme appears to have responded to the rhetoric
in Schaumburg and Munson by regulating the percentage of income
received by professional solicitors with a more narrowly-tailored,
three-tiered standard of reasonableness. A fee paid to professional
solicitors of under 20% was automatically considered reasonable; a
fee of 20% to 35% would be deemed unreasonable "if the party chal-
lenging the fund-raising fee also proves that the solicitation does not
involve the dissemination of information, discussion or advocacy relat-
ing to public issues;"8 and a fee in excess of 35% was presumed un-
reasonable, but this presumption could be overcome if the
professional solicitor could "successfully defend" the fee because it
involved advocacy, information or dissemination, or because the fee
was necessary financially to allow the charity to raise money.89 This
regulatory scheme provided for a more finely-tuned mechanism for
determining reasonableness of the solicitor's fee, but such reasonable-
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-17.2(c) (1986).
89. 487 U.S. at 784, 785. The statute in question provides: "Any person who acts as a
professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor shall apply for and obtain an annual
license from the Department, and shall not act as a professional fund-raising counsel or profes-
sional solicitor until after obtaining such license. A person who is authorized to act on behalf of
a licensed professional fund-raising counsel or a licensed professional solicitor is not required to
obtain a license under this section." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-6 (1986).
The regulations regarding reasonable fees are as follows:
"(a) No professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor who contracts to raise
funds for a person established for a charitable purpose may charge such person established for a
charitable purpose an excessive and unreasonable fund-raising fee for raising such funds.
"(b) For purposes of this section a fund-raising fee of twenty percent (20%) or less of the
gross receipts of all solicitations on behalf of a particular person established for a charitable
purpose is deemed to be reasonable and nonexcessive.
"(c) For purposes of this section a fund-raising fee greater than twenty percent (20%) but
less than thirty-five percent (35%) of the gross receipts of all solicitations on behalf of a particu-
lar person established for a charitable purpose is excessive and unreasonable if the party chal-
lenging the fund-raising fee also proves that the solicitation does not involve the dissemination
of information, discussion, or advocacy relating to public issues as directed by the person estab-
lished for a charitable purpose which is to benefit from the solicitation.
"(d) For purposes of this section only, a fund-raising fee of thirty-five percent (35%) or
more of the gross receipts of all solicitations on behalf of a particular person established for a
charitable purpose may be excessive and unreasonable without further evidence of any other
fact by the party challenging the fund-raising fee. The professional fund-raising counsel or pro-
fessional solicitor may successfully defend the fund-raising fee by proving that the level of the
fee charged was necessary:
"(1) Because of the dissemination of information, discussion, or advocacy relating to public
issues as directed by the person established for a charitable purpose which is to benefit from the
solicitation; or
"(2) Because otherwise ability of the person established for a charitable purpose which is to
benefit from the solicitations to raise money or communicate its ideas, opinions, and positions to
the public would be significantly diminished.
"(e) Where the fund-raising fee charged by a professional fund-raising counsel or profes-
sional solicitor is determined to be excessive and unreasonable, the fact finder making that de-
termination shall then determine a reasonable fee under the circumstances. The difference
between the fee charged and the reasonable fee as determined by the fact finder shall to paid by
professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor to the person established for a charita-
ble purpose which initially was charged the excessive and unreasonable fee." N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 131C-17.2 (1986).
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ness remained relevant only if the Court was willing to accept that
there exists a direct relationship between the money raised and the
percentage which is used for charitable purposes. Again the statute
was based on this hypothesis, despite its having been twice rejected by
the Court.
The Court in Riley reiterated its rejection of this argument. The
majority was unimpressed by arguments that the fees paid to profes-
sional solicitors bore any direct relation to the protection of the public
against fraud.90 The Court went further to discourage the notion that
the hearing process reduced the burden on speech. The costs of the
hearing process, the uncertainty of the outcome in a particular case,
the vagueness of the standard under which the burden is placed on the
fundraisers to establish reasonableness, and the potential for litigation
all serve to increase rather than decrease the negative impact on the
First Amendment right of the charities. 91
The Court also rejected the North Carolina argument that the
state has an interest in ensuring that the maximum amount of funds
reach the charity.92 The Court characterized this interest as paternal-
istic; a role which the Court has often rejected in cases involving First
Amendment rights of free speech. "[T]he government, even with the
purest of motives, may not substitute its judgment as to how best to
speak for that of speakers and listeners; free and robust debate cannot
thrive if directed by the government." 93
The second prong of Riley stands out as equally important, and
raised issues not addressed in either Schaumburg or Munson. The
North Carolina statute called for mandatory disclosure at the time of
the solicitation. The disclosure required the solicitor's name, the
name and address of the professional solicitor's employee or fundrais-
ing counsel, and the "average of the percentage of gross receipts actu-
ally paid" to the charity in the past 12 months.94
90. 487 U.S. at 788-789.
91. Id. at 794.
92. Id. at 789-790.
93. Id. at 791.
94. The North Carolina statute provides:
"During any solicitation and before requesting or appealing either directly or indirectly for
any charitable contribution a professional solicitor shall disclose to the person solicited:
"(1) His name; and
"(2) The name of the professional solicitor or professional fund-raising counsel by whom he
is employed and the address of his employer; and
"(3) The average of the percentage of gross receipts actually paid to the persons established
for a charitable purpose by the professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor con-
ducting the solicitation for all charitable sales promotions conducted in this State by the profes-
sional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor for the past 12 months, or for all completed
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Since requiring speech the speaker would not have otherwise
made is presumed to alter the speech, mandatory disclosure is a form
of content-based speech regulation.95 The State did not argue that
this is not content-based regulation, but that the standard applied
should be the "more deferential standard" applied to commercial
speech. The Court rejected this analysis. 96
The standard to apply in speech regulation is the totality of the
speech "taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement
thereon. ' 97 As in Schaumburg, parts of the solicitation cannot be
dealt with separately from other parts. The request for funds and the
dissemination of information are inexorably linked, the fundraising
"intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech. ' 98 The
standard of review must be applicable to the entire content of the
speech, rather than to one segment of the communication. As a re-
sult, the disclosure requirement must be viewed as a content-based
regulation and as applied is unduly burdensome and not narrowly tai-
lored to meet the state need to protect potential donors from abuses
by professional solicitors.99
The result of this trilogy of Supreme Court case law has been to
eliminate existing state mechanisms or require substantial revision of
many of the state statutes regarding disclosure and solicitation fees.
Although it has been over twelve years since Schaumburg was first
decided, the effects of Riley, Munson, and Schaumburg are only be-
ginning to be felt throughout the country. Many of the most publi-
cized abuses in the nonprofit sector, however, have come after Riley,
and the public sentiment remains strong that something must be done.
Whatever that "something" is, it must directly address the two First
Amendment concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Riley: (i)
that the regulation cannot connect reasonableness with the fees paid
to professional solicitors; and (ii) that the state cannot mandate any
disclosure as part of the solicitation process.
charitable sales promotions where the professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor
has been soliciting funds for less than 12 months." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-16.1 (1986).
95. Id. at 795 (citing MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING Co. v. TORNILLO, 418 U.S. 241, 256
(1974)) ("statute compelling newspaper to print an editorial reply 'exacts a penalty on the basis
of the content of a newspaper' ").
96. Id. at 795-796.
97. Id. at 796.
98. Id., (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632).
99. Id. at 798.
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I1. HOME REMEDIES FOR CHARITABLE REGULATION
Whether accomplished by state or federal legislation, action must
be taken to address the perception problem charities are facing with
the public, while effectively combating the increasing fraud which is
alarming both the public and the state governments. The solution
must also comply with Riley, not only because Riley will now serve as
a threshold test for appropriateness of legislative action, but because
the Supreme Court's concerns in Riley accurately assess the impact of
poorly tailored legislative efforts at curtailing professional fundraising.
Equally important, the solutions developed must be acceptable to
the vast number of well-run, respected charities. Over sixty organiza-
tions filed as Amici Curiae in support of the Lighthouse for the Blind
in Riley, and these briefs included a large number of law enforcement
associations as well as other highly regarded public charities.1°° These
100. The Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama Sheriffs' Association et. al. in support of Appellees
at 1, Riley v. National Federation of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328) included: Alabama
Sheriffs' Association, Colorado Professional Fire Fighters, Combined Law Enforcement As-
sociations of Texas, Florida Association of State Troopers, Inc., Florida Peace Officers' Associa-
tion, Florida Police Benevolent Association, Fraternal Order of Police California State Lodge,
Fraternal Order of Police Colorado State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police Louisiana State
Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police Illinois State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police Nebraska State
Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police Ohio, Inc., Fraternal Order of Police Virginia State Lodge,
Georgia State Firemen's Association, Iowa State Troopers' Association, Maryland Sheriffs' As-
sociation, Michigan State Fire Fighters Union, Minnesota State Patrol Troopers Association,
Missouri Peace Officers' Association, Missouri State Troopers' Association, Inc., Nebraska Pro-
fessional Fire Fighters Association, Nevada Highway Patrol Association, Ohio Association of
Professional Fire Fighters, Ohio Troopers' Coalition, Inc., Peace Officers' Association of Geor-
gia, Tennessee Law Enforcement Officers' Association, Virginia State Sheriffs' Association, Vir-
ginia State Association of Professional Fire Fighters, Wisconsin Law Enforcement Officers'
Association, Wisconsin Troopers' Association, Inc..
The Brief of Amici Curiae Independent Sector, American Cancer Society, American Red
Cross, Care, Inc., Certain Other Independent Sector Members and Other Nonprofit Organiza-
tions in Support of Appellees at 1, Riley v. National Federation of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
(No. 87-328) included: Independent Sector Members, AAUW Educational Foundation, Aid As-
sociation for Lutherans, American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel, Trust for Philanthropy,
American Cancer Society, American Committee on Africa, American Diabetes Association,
American Foundation for the Blind, American Institute for Cancer Research, American Leader-
ship Forum, American Lung Association, American Red Cross, American Social Health Associ-
ation, Arthritis Foundation, Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges,
Asthma and Allergy Foundation, CARE, Inc., The Carroll Center for the Blind, Catholic Chari-
ties, USA, Center for Creative Management, Chorus America, The Committee for Healing
Community, Huntington's Disease Society of America, Institute for Nonprofit Organization
Management, International Association of Psycho-Social Rehabilitation Services, Lutheran Re-
sources Commission, March of Dimes Birth Defect Foundation, National Alliance for the Men-
tally Ill, National Association of Homes for Children, National Association for Hospital
Development, National Council for International Visitors, National Council for Research on
Women, National Easter Seal Society, Inc., National Health Council, National Institute for Dis-
pute Resolution, National Multiple Sclerosis Society, National Society to Prevent Blindness, Na-
tional Sudden Infant Death Syndrome Foundation, Inc., National Training & Information
Center, Native American Rights Fund, NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund, Order Wo-
men's League, Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America, Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion of America, Inc., Support Centers of America Theatre Communications Group, United
Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, World Wildlife FundTThe Conservation Fund,
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police association and other charities will welcome efforts which re-
duce fraud and boost community confidence. Effective regulation will
serve the community-minded charities as well as the state regulators,
while ineffective or counterproductive regulation will continue to fuel
the conflict between the state officials and the fundraising profession-
als, further eroding public confidence as a result of the debate.
The Court decision in Riley should serve as a starting point for
developing the most reasonable mechanism to curtail fraud and im-
prove public perception: The potential donors.
A. Membership for All Organizations
In an ideal world, nonprofit organizations would not require
greater regulation than for-profit corporations. Optimists would ar-
gue that even today, the majority of charitable organizations are run
by public-minded individuals, and that these organizations actually
need far less regulation than do their for-profit counterparts. The op-
timists may be right but, even so, some effective regulatory tools are
necessary. As discussed in Part II, Section D., nonprofits have a
greater need for some form of additional regulation since so few of
the for-profit self-regulatory mechanisms are available in the non-
profit, non-membership organization.
A membership requirement or creation of a statutory member-
ship category would instantly create a self-selecting police force of in-
dividuals who have a vested interest in the organization but who
currently have no voice. Necessary governance issues including
proper management, efficiency, purpose and scope of the organization
would have an appropriate body to address these issues.
The membership should be treated like the shareholders in a for-
profit organization. Absent good faith or in the case of exceptionally
bad judgment, a director will be responsible to the corporation and to
the membership. A board of directors acting in good faith will remain
under the doctrine of the "Business Judgment Rule" and be protected
from interference by the membership.101
YWCA of USA National Board. Other Nonprofit Organizations joined in the brief include
Americans for Indian Opportunity, National Hemophilia Foundation, Nurses House, Inc., Public
Voice for Food and Health Policy, Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights, and Tourette Syn-
drome Association, Inc.
101. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat. Train. Sch. for Deacon. & M., 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (business judgment rule and the duty of care is applicable for nonprofit directors, but
such directors must exercise good faith and reasonable care to avoid liability); cf Christiansen v.
National Say. and Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that director's duties run to
corporation and not to beneficiaries of the organization).
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The business judgment rule stems from the well established busi-
ness principle that the board of directors is vested with the rights and
duties of corporate management, that the directors must act in good
faith, and with some standard of reasonable care.1° 2 "The rule itself
'is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the hon-
est belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.' "103
The business judgment rule does not protect directors from liabil-
ity based on fraud, self-dealing or conflicts of interest. Many state
statutes include procedures for dealing with situations involving con-
flicts of interest. Such rules require a majority vote of disinterested
directors to approve of any transaction involving a financial conflict of
interest. Prior to the vote, all material facts must be disclosed and the
transaction must be fair and in the interests of the corporation. 1° 4 A
director must follow these statutes to be insulated from personal lia-
bility. Otherwise, the self-dealing director can be held personally lia-
ble for the damages to the corporation.
In this way, the legal presumptions and well developed body of
corporate law will guide the relationship between members and the
board of directors. The "application of the duty of care and duty of
loyalty already works for existing membership organizations, and
nothing seems to indicate that this structure would not provide the
same results for existing nonprofits which were encouraged to open
up a membership structure.
An alternative to a required membership category would be a
"statutory membership" category. For non-member organizations,
the state could designate that existing donors may be treated as mem-
bers for state law purposes. This would provide standing to sue in the
case of membership derivative suits and require reporting to these
statutory members under state reporting requirements. 10 5
Giving standing to a major contributor to an organization has a
strong nexus to the issue of accountability and reduction of fraud.
The individual who stands the greatest chance of being injured has the
best opportunity to stop the injury or sue for redress. Taking a cue
102. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). Some nonprofit corporate stat-
utes include statutory definitions of the duty of care and loyalty. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 7231
(Deering 1993); K-y. STAr. AiN. § 273.215 (1988); N.Y. NoT-Fo-PRoFIr CORP. LAW § 717 (Mc-
Kinney 1993); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5715(A) and (D) (1993).
103. Id., quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
104. E.g. Ill. C.S. ANN. CH. 805 ILCS 105/108.60 (1993); MINN. STAT. § 317A.255 (1992); N.Y.
NoT-FoR-PRoIrr CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1993).
105. See infra part 2.
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from the professional solicitors, the statutory membership could be set
as a minimum percentage of existing donors with the largest financial
stake in the organization. A general rule of thumb in the fundraising
community is that twenty percent of the donors contribute eighty per-
cent of the revenue. 1' 6 Following this rule, state or federal legislation
can mandate that in non-member organizations, any donor who has
made contributions which would put that donor in the upper twenty-
percent of donors would have the same rights to standing as if that
contributor were a member of the organization.
A statutory membership which entitled all of the contributors in
the upper twenty percent of giving to have standing in the case of a
derivative action may create more reform than any of the other ac-
tions proposed to date. As has been shown with for-profit corpora-
tions, the role of outsiders is not so much to aggressively stop
improper activity, as to remind the key leadership that there is some-
one who has the right to review the operations. Such review actively
discourages self-dealing and provides a mechanism to redress such
wrongs if they occur.
Well run organizations will turn this burden into a benefit. As
statutory members, these donors may be treated with more regard.
Increased attention and involvement should lead to a healthier organi-
zation with a stronger level of public support.
A necessary element of such change is greater protection from
personal liability to the officers and directors, particularly the volun-
teer directors. For those situations in which no self-dealing is estab-
lished, damages should be limited to injunctive relief and rescission.
The officer or director should be indemnified and protected from per-
sonal liability unless the individual personally committed misconduct.
The purpose of the contemplated changes must be to encourage better
government of our charitable institutions. If a side effect of new regu-
lations creates a strong disincentive to serve with a charity, the pur-
106. Telephone Interview with Gary Tobin, Director of The Cohen Center for Jewish Studies
at Brandeis University (October 14, 1993). The figure of twenty percent is an approximation of
financial information gathered from years of fundraising by major umbrella organizations such
as United Jewish Appeal and United Way. Such a guide should serve only as a starting point for
legislative hearings on the development of a formula for determining the minimum number of
donors or minimum percentage of donors which will have sufficient impact to serve a regulatory
function.
The actual number may not have to be very large to become effective. As seen in the
securities industry, the number of people who actually read a prospectus prior to purchasing
securities is not large, but the process of preparing the information, the knowledge that the
information is public and the impact the disclosure has if improperly done all serve to make
securities disclosure extremely effective. LARRY D. SODEROUISr, UNDERSTANDING THE SECUR-
nInEs LAWS 103 (1990), supra, note 67.
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pose of the rules are undermined. The instances of fraud will involve
the necessary self-dealing to provide for personal liability against the
wrongdoer.10 7 Opening the board of directors to all forms of tort lia-
bility will undermine the purpose of these proposals, discourage vol-
untarism and risk encouraging speculative lawsuits which would
further erode public confidence in otherwise well-managed charities.
Granting voting rights to statutory members of charities would
further strengthen the self-enforcement principle being suggested.
Members are involved in the organization and overall policies of their
agencies. To receive an annual meeting notice, to review the names of
the proposed slate of officers and directors, and to participate in the
democratic process that would come to the organization cannot help
but encourage the members and result in a more responsive charity,
committed to the needs of the community.
Organizations which object to giving voting rights to only select
donors can expand voting rights to all donors, or to all donors over
any minimum threshold set by the organization. The statutory scheme
should establish that the upper twenty percent of donors be guaran-
teed voting rights, but that the organization may expand voting rights
quite broadly, in whatever manner the agency deems to be in the best
interest of the organization. This democratization of charitable life
will force insulated leadership to come out of the back rooms and ad-
dress the organization's concerns directly before the charity's inter-
ested constituency.
The state need only become involved in those (hopefully) rare
instances where the charity tries to avoid its obligations to its newly
democratized population. This solution allows the state, the agency
and the donor to all benefit without running afoul of the Riley
prohibitions or concerns.
The requirement of voting rights for religious organizations may
be more difficult to require by statute. Under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, religious organizations are constitu-
tionally protected from laws which entangle government in religion.10 8
107. There are, of course, instances of fraud or misrepresentation which do not include self-
dealing. For example, in Marcus v. Jewish Nat. Fund, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 886 (1990), the fundraising
organization was permanently enjoined from misleading advertising because its promotional
materials improperly suggested that funds went not only to Israel but to the occupied territories,
when in fact no funds had been expended in these areas. This example illustrates why injunctive
relief should be the exclusive remedy against the board of directors, and no personal liability
should attach as the result of such misrepresentation.
108. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971). Lemon establishes a three-prong test
to determine if a law violates the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, Board of Edu. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not
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A statute which requires the rights of membership be granted to a
group of individuals based on governmental guidelines rather than on
religious principles may run afoul of this First Amendment protection.
As a result, there may be a limit to the governmental regulation which
can be utilized for religious organizations. In Larson v. Valente,1' 9 the
Supreme Court reviewed a Minnesota disclosure requirement which
was drafted in a manner that gave an exemption to certain religious
organizations, including the Roman Catholic Archdiocese. 110 The
Court said that "[wie do not suggest that the burdens of compliance
with the [Minnesota legislation] would be intrinsically impermissible if
they were imposed evenhandedly. But this statute does not operate
evenhandedly, nor was it designed to do so.. .. "11' As a result, there
may be First Amendment implications if the state ordered the require-
ment that members had the right to vote on directors or policy at an-
nual meetings." 2 Nonetheless, self-regulation through a system of
voting membership remains preferable to regulation by the state. If
the First Amendment concerns are voluntarily waived by a religious
organization, or if a system can be developed which will withstand the
strict scrutiny of First Amendment review, then the model of self-reg-
ulation can be expanded to include religious organizations along with
other charitable agencies.
B. Mandatory Disclosure with Riley Guidelines
While the Court in Riley declared mandatory disclosure unconsti-
tutional as part of a solicitation, the Court did not prohibit all
mandatory disclosure. The North Carolina statute which requires dis-
closure of the amount of funds which are given to the charity upon
request was not challenged, nor were the solicitation disclosure provi-
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970]."
In drafting any rules on membership and disclosure, the government must be very careful to
make the rules neutral regarding all religions and not attempt to disproportionately regulate
those religious groups which use door-to-door solicitors or other public forums. Such an act was
struck down in Minnesota for having a disproportionate effect on the Unification Church. Lar-
son v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1992).
109. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1992).
110. Id. at 254.
111. Id. at 253.
112. In addition to the Establishment clause issues, a problem may also exist under the Free
Exercise Clause if the rules were seen as the imposition of regulations which ran contrary to the
government structure required by the religion. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Such free exercise requirements do not absolve all government regulations such as social security
taxes. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Following Lee, granting a donor standing to
sue a church for improper or fraudulent use of one's donation should not be a sufficiently oner-
ous requirement on the free exercise of religion to be prohibited under the First Amendment.
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sions regarding the name of the solicitor and the name and address of
the solicitor's employer.113
More importantly, the Court focused on the disputed disclosure
requirements as part of a general solicitation, when such speech is
necessarily entwined with the discussion or advocacy of the organiza-
tion.114 Nothing in the decision prohibits the requirement of
mandatory disclosure in the context of an annual statement to mem-
bers. To the contrary, the Court itself suggested that "the State may
itself publish the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires profes-
sional fundraisers to file." 115 The reason for this suggestion was that
"[t]his procedure would communicate the desired information to the
public without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech during the
course of a solicitation."'1 6
Mandatory disclosure of the charity's basic management and fi-
nancial status is essentially commercial speech, which should be made
available to the membership. Communicated separately from any
other discussion or solicitation, this information should fall within the
guidelines of Riley and satisfy the second prong of the States' interest
in ensuring that the public is making an informed decision.117 The
requirement that every charity publish a simple, one or two page dis-
closure statement and mail this statement to the membership will
serve this intended purpose well." 8 Without the need for any addi-
113. Riley 487 U.S. at 799.
114. Id. at 796.
115. Id. at 800.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See Maine Brief, supra, note 67, at 28.
118. In Larson, the Court Addressed what it deemed a stringent disclosure requirement, and
the related exemption to reporting for certain religious organizations. Minnesota Charitable
Solicitations Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50-309.61 (1969 and Supp. 1982). The statute required that
charitable organizations register with the Minnesota Department of Commerce before soliciting
contributions within the State. § 309.52. "With certain specified exemptions, all charitable orga-
nizations registering under § 309.52 must file an extensive annual report with the Department,
detailing, inter alia, their total receipts and income from all sources, their costs of management,
fundraising, and public education, and their transfers of property or funds out of the State, along
with a description of the recipients and purposes of those transfers. § 309.53. The Department
[of Commerce] is authorized by the Act to deny or withdraw the registration of any charitable
organization if [it] finds that it would be in 'the public interest' to do so and if the organization is
found to have engaged in fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest practices. § 309.532, subd. 1 (Supp.
1982)." Larson at 231.
The Court addressed the exemption to registration for those religious organizations which
received more than fifty percent of their fundraising income from members, finding that this
exemption was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The purpose
and effect of this exemption was to favor some religious organizations over others. Id. at 254.
Although the Court found § 309.515 unconstitutional, the Court did not invalidate the dis-
closure itself. "We do not suggest that the burdens of compliance with the [disclosure require-
ments] would be intrinsically impermissible if they were imposed evenhandedly."
The opinion of Larson must be followed closely to establish a fair and even-handed ap-
proach to disclosure requirements so that the impact on all organizations is evenly applied.
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tional state action, potential donors will quickly become aware that all
charities must provide this information. Soon potential donors will
begin to request such information in advance of making a contribu-
tion. This would most likely be true even without a law requiring that
information requested must be forwarded. "[I]f the solicitor refuses
to give the requested information, the potential donor may (and prob-
ably would) refuse to donate." 119 In those instances where the poten-
tial donor does not want the information, there is no sound policy for
the state to require that the information be forthcoming.120 The re-
quest for information should come from the potential donor, and not
be required reading.
The content of the short disclosure form must be developed in
concert with the interested charitable agencies. Since current law re-
quires charities to make Form 990 tax returns available upon re-
quest,121 this would be a natural starting point for the information
required to be disclosed. 122 The North Carolina statute and others
119. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799.
120. When a potential donor purchases cookies or candy, the charitable impact may be only
one small part of the decision. Often, the most important factors in such a transaction are the
taste of the sweets, the dimples on the six-year-old solicitor and the knowledge that the solici-
tor's grandparent happens to be the potential donor's boss.
121. I.R.C. § 6104. As in other areas of the law governing religious organizations, this disclo-
sure requirement does not apply to churches and some organizations with religious affiliation.
See also n. 108, supra, and accompanying text.
122. Certain organizations described in section 501(c)(3). -
Every organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is subject to the requirements of
subsection (a) shall furnish annually information, at such time and in such manner as the Secre-
tary may by forms or regulations prescribe, setting forth -
(1) its gross income for the year,
(2) its expenses attributable to such income and incurred within the year,
(3) its disbursements within the year for the purposes for which it is exempt,
(4) a balance sheet showing its assets, liabilities, and net worth as of the beginning of such
year,
(5) the total of the contributions and gifts received by it during the year, and the names and
addresses of all substantial contributors,
(6) the names and addresses of its foundation managers (within the meaning of section
4946(b)(1)) and highly compensated employees,
(7) the compensation and other payments made during the year to each individual de-
scribed in paragraph (g),
(8) in the case of an organization with respect to which an election under section 501(h)
[lobbying election] is effective for the taxable year, the following amounts for such organization
for such taxable year:
(A) the lobbying expenditures (as defined in section 4911(c)(1)),
(B) the lobbying nontaxable amount (as defined in section 4911(c)(2)),
(C) the grass roots expenditures (as defined in section 4911(c)(3)), and
(D) the grass roots nontaxable amount (as defined in section 4911(c)(4)),
(9) such other information with respect to direct or indirect transfers to, and other direct or
indirect transactions and relationships with, other organizations described in section 501(c)
(other than paragraph (3) thereof) or section 527 as the Secretary may require to prevent -
(A) diversion of funds from the organization's exempt purpose, or
(b) misallocation of revenues or expenses, and
(1) such other information for purposes of carrying out the internal revenue laws as the
Secretary may require. I.R.C. § 6033(b) (1987).
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that focus on the percentage of fees retained by professional solicitors
do not address the more central issue of charitable efficiency. Annual
disclosure requirements should be developed in conjunction within
the existing framework of proper accounting procedures for nonprofit
agencies. While pay given to professional solicitors may be of interest,
it is only one component of the costs of providing charity. Salary ex-
penses, rental expenses, benefits and administrative costs may be
equally important in assessing efficiency as the pay for outside
solicitors.
Again, the better agencies will turn this obligation into a promo-
tional tool, highlighting the successes of the organization, its efficiency
or growth and the effectiveness of selected programs. Thereafter, the
marketplace will determine which charities continue to grow and re-
ceive donations and which fall out of favor because they do not effec-
tively utilize the contributions received. As Brandeis commented on
the securities industry decades ago, "sunshine is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." 123 It is no
less true today, nor any less relevant in the area of nonprofit
disclosure.
For this to work, the regulatory system must also become easier
for charities to understand. Federal legislation, fifty separate state
systems and thousands of city, village and county regulations make the
registration process a morass of paperwork and encourage the use of
professional fundraisers, because only a professional can navigate the
roiling regulatory waters. Like the securities laws, federal disclosure
guidelines would best serve to provide uniform disclosure upon which
the public will come to rely. An organization which has properly filed
with the federal government 124 should be exempt from filing with the
state and with each county and city government prior to conducting
solicitations. At worst, the same completed form should be required
to be sent into both the state and federal offices simultaneously, prior
to public distribution.
Additional rules add substantially to the disclosure requirement. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6033-1(a)(4)
(1992). These may not serve any additional purpose in the context of public disclosure.
123. Larry D. Soderquist, Understanding the Securities Laws at 2 (1990).
124. Filing should be regulated through the Commerce Department, not the IRS. The objec-
tive of full and fair disclosure to the public is not directly related to the tax assessment or tax
waiver process, and will serve as a barrier to participation by organizations. Of course the Com-
merce Department can use the Form 990 as a guide in developing disclosure requirements, but
the goal is to create a simple-to-read statement of the organization's operations and financial
history. It would be naive and counterproductive to put the IRS in charge of developing forms
that are "simple to read."
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In addition, it may be necessary to create tiers of disclosure de-
pending on the size of the organization as measured by the scope of its
gross fundraising activities. The record keeping and reporting re-
quirements of an agency which collects $12,000 each year must be
much simpler than an agency with an operating budget in excess of
$1,000,000. Input is critical, from both accounting professionals and
the nonprofit agencies, as to how to require disclosure in the simplest
and most coherent fashion.
If such disclosure requirements are well tailored to the needs of
the agencies and the concerns of the public, then the government, the
organizations and the objects of the charitable work will all be better
served.
Annual disclosure coupled with statutory membership will create
a two-pronged attack on fraud and public mistrust. The public will no
longer have to wait for the local paper to run another expose, detail-
ing the fall of another local institution. The local donors will be aware
of problems while they can still be corrected, and involvement will
increase as a result. The net effect of these two changes will be to add
democratic, market regulation to an area which is in desperate need of
positive, rather than punitive, change. Reinvigorating membership
and reinventing disclosure is the best next step.
Just as charity begins at home, these suggestions will allow chari-
table regulation to begin at home as well. At the home of each con-
tributor, at the home office of every agency, and at the home of each
annual meeting, the gift of charity will be given and the responsibility
of charity will be taught. Charity will again obey reason, and the do-
nor will feel confident that the administration is honest, prudent and
capable.
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